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Conflict prevention is currently experiencing a new wave of political interest, in 
the United Nations, the European Union and countries like Germany. By 
distinguishing and elaborating three ideal-type approaches to the study of conflict 
prevention as science, craft, or art, we argue that key lessons from 20 years of 
conflict prevention practice and research have not been learned yet. Official 
documents and parts of the literature are too often confined to a technocratic 
understanding of conflict prevention drawing on positivist conflict forecasting 
(science) and toolbox approaches to ‘what works’ when (craft). Moreover, 
wishful thinking affects the expected influence of external actors as well as 
warning response dynamics within organisations. Drawing on extensive research 
involving multiple cases and actors, we elaborate on how the ‘art’ dimension of 
conflict prevention is important to understanding and meeting conflict prevention 
challenge in three important fields: forecasting and early warning, organisational 
and decision-making structures, and diplomacy and engagement strategies. The 
paper argues for paying closer attention to informal, individual, and political 
dimensions of prevention and a more fine-grained understanding of how art, craft 
and science approaches can complement each other.  
 
Keywords: conflict prevention, early warning, early action, international 
organizations, diplomacy 
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1 Introduction 
The prevention of armed conflict has received a wave of renewed interest by 
international organizations and governments. UN Secretary-General Guterres has 
declared prevention to be his number one priority, the EU promotes ‘acting promptly on 
prevention’ in its 2016 Global Strategy, and the German government has adopted new 
guidelines on crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace building (European Union, 
2016; Federal Republic of Germany, 2017; UN Security Council, 2017). However, this 
second wave of international conflict prevention risks repeating an important 
shortcoming of previous attention to prevention, which Stedman called an ‘oversold 
alchemy’ (1995). To varying degrees, these latest strategic documents, reviews and 
initiatives continue to treat conflict prevention as a technical and bureaucratic exercise 
in the pursuit of vaguely defined objectives, whilst underestimating or altogether 
ignoring significant cognitive, practical, political and indeed ethical challenges to the 
policy. Conflict prevention is relevant at all stages of violent conflict and might be 
understood as proactive and forward-looking efforts to avoid or contain the escalation 
of organised violence (World Bank and United Nations, 2018, p. 5). While also relevant 
in contexts of major power conflict, we agree with Call and Campbell (2018, p. 65) that 
“a general consensus has emerged that conflict prevention should focus on preventing 
civil wars and mass violence.” 
We argue that conflict prevention (CP) can be usefully analysed, critiqued and 
reformed with reference to three ideal-typical research approaches in this field:  Conflict 
prevention as a positivist science, as a craft, or as an art. These ideal-types can be 
distinguished according to their (meta-) theoretical assumptions about their theoretical 
objectives, the measurability of success, and implied theory of change, as well as 
according to their areas of application and resultant products and practices.  
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Clarifying the assumptions behind each of these ideal-types can help 
practitioners engaged in prevention to better understand the added value as well as the 
limitations of each approach and thus avoid some of the pitfalls and wishful thinking 
that beset conflict prevention efforts over the last 20 years. We argue that official 
strategic and review documents as well as some of the grey literature tends to highlight 
the first two approaches – what we call science and craft – and underappreciate the third 
one of CP as an art; this third type captures the difficulties practitioners face when 
making choices about goals and means and how ‘success’ depends on individuals 
expertise and networks, skills and motivations, as well as the management of tensions 
between individual roles on the one hand and social and organisational practices on the 
other.  
Scholars of prevention will benefit from our review of the literature through the 
three ideal type approaches to the study of prevention that we identify and our 
suggestions of how insights from social constructivist, critical, and practice theoretical 
works can enhance the existing research strands in prevention. We argue that 
heightened attention to informal, individual and local aspects of conflict prevention can 
help to avoid yet more disappointment for the practice to live-up to expectations. 
Furthermore, the expectations themselves cannot be formulated without engaging with 
both the normative trade-offs as well as the complex entanglement of humanitarian with 
self-regarding and organisational policy objectives. Our approach distils three ideal-
types to draw attention to “the big picture”. We use the terms “science”, “craft”, and 
“art” as heuristic short hands for distinct sets of assumptions and epistemic goals in CP, 
which have implications for how change is being conceptualised and what is deemed 
most important. The first term refers to a positivist sub-set of social sciences rather than 
implying that craft and art are outside the realm of social scientific investigations. 
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Our argument draws inspiration from Barnett Rubin’s seminal book Blood on 
the doorstep in which he argues that ‘all prevention is political’ rather than a 
technocratic or apolitical exercise (Rubin, 2002b, p. 131). Technocratic forms of 
governance tend to be justified by the central role of expertise in solving particular 
problems coupled with concerns that the dominance of non-expert politicians would be 
counterproductive or dysfunctional to goal attainment. However, Rubin stresses the 
difficulty of answering the perceptively easy question of ‘what are you trying to 
prevent’ given that the choice is not simply between acting and non-acting, but about 
‘setting priorities among various goals and deciding among various strategies, with 
different implications for interests, values and ideologies’ (p. 130). Outside actors are 
often rightly suspect of pursuing hidden agendas when engaging in ‘prevention’, 
especially in so far as they may be as much ‘part of the problem’ as they are ‘part of the 
solution’ in the first place (p. 128). Despite these difficulties, Rubin does not give up on 
prevention. For him, “prevention means more than acting early: it means integrating 
proactive, forward-looking measures into actions at every stage and remaining alert to 
the dangers of escalation even as peace agreements are being implemented" (p. 147). To 
achieve this objective, he acknowledges that scientific models to assess conflict risks 
can add value, but emphasises “the ancient Greeks metis, or practical wisdom, the 
practitioner’s knowledge” (2002: p. 148).  
Rubin does not explicitly talk about conflict prevention as science, craft or art, nor does 
he explicate and use this distinction further in his work as far as we are aware. This 
article thus goes substantially beyond his work as we explicate our argument in four 
steps. The next section explains our framework of science, craft, and art in more detail, 
and how it relates to recent academic and policy discussions on prevention. After that, 
we apply the framework to three important dimensions of conflict prevention: 
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forecasting and early warning (section three), organisational and decision-making 
structures (section four), and diplomacy and engagement strategies (section five). We 
conclude with some pointers for further research on conflict prevention.  
The paper has been informed by extensive research the authors have conducted on a 
range of conflict cases (especially Estonia 1993, Turkey/Kurds 2003, Ukraine 2013-14, 
Sri Lanka and South Sudan) involving Western states (especially the UK, Germany and 
the USA) and international organisations (UN, EU, OSCE). In addition to extensive 
literature reviews we conducted more than 300 semi-structured interviews, about two 
thirds of them with diplomats, analysts and officials from different parts of government 
engaged in CP, plus practitioners from NGOs, think-tanks and news media. The 
interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2018 as part of two distinct projects of the 
authors and asked both case-specific and generic questions about early warning and 
response and preventive diplomacy. The first was primarily focused on the 
communication and perception of conflict early warnings as cases of persuasion, 
whereas the second employed a practice approach to study predominantly local 
challenges to diplomatic conflict prevention in two conflict settings. In most cases, we 
were able to record and then transcribe the interviews, usually on the condition of 
interviewees remaining anonymous when citing, but some interviewees preferred to talk 
‘off the record’ both figuratively and literally. The interviews were read closely and 
analysed, particularly with regard to practitioners’ views of the three dimensions of 
conflict prevention mentioned above. 
2 Three approaches to conflict prevention 
In a field with such a close connection to policy as conflict prevention, theoretical 
reflections of underlying assumptions are less frequent, even in the substantial academic 
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writing on this topic that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Carment and 
Schnabel, 2004; Jentleson, 2003; Lund, 2002; Schnabel and Carment, 2004; 
Wallensteen and Möller, 2003). In international relations, the distinction between 
research approaches has a long tradition, dating back to discipline-forming grand 
debates (Schmidt, 2002; Waever, 1996). More recently, such grand debates have given 
way to a recognition that different ontological and epistemological commitments come 
with their own scope conditions – or at least benign ignorance. Furthermore, core 
insights of social constructivism for example about the importance of norms, ideas, and 
identities have been taken up by rationalist scholars (Sikkink and Kim, 2013; Simmons, 
2009; Weinstein, 2007). Analytical eclecticism and mixed methods studies try to 
combine the comparative strengths of different approaches (Cornut, 2015a; Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010). Critical theory asks us to interrogate claims of ‘problem-solving’ 
and whether problem-definitions, particularly in the realm of security are bottom-up and 
emancipatory, or top-down and, perhaps inadvertently, exclusionary and harmful 
(Booth, 2005; Kanno, 2014).  
If one research approach dominates research and policy documents, there is a risk that 
some questions are left out, and that the weaknesses of dominant approaches are 
ignored. Results with a limited validity may be deemed as evidence of ‘what works’ and 
extrapolated across the whole spectrum of preventive action. There may be frustration 
among decision-makers over probabilistic, vague and hedged assessments about future 
conflict that are near useless in the policy-process, counter-factual ‘success stories’ that 
cannot be effectively sold, and warnings that fail to persuade. Both researchers and 
practitioner may look for certainty where it does not exist (cf. Wallensteen and Möller, 
2003) and are blindsided to questions, actors and methodologies that may have a higher 
potential for preventing violent conflict. To identify and break-out of the prevailing 
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approaches, we set-out briefly the three ideal-typical conceptions and their ontological 
assumptions, theoretical objectives, measures of success, and implied theories of change 
as well as their main fields of application, and resultant practices (see Table 1). Again, 
to emphasize, the labels we use refer to the underlying understanding of prevention of 
each research approach. All the research presented here is part of social science, not just 
the ideas discussed relating to “science”. 
A positivist scientific lens implies approaching conflict prevention as a field 
requiring the identification of the ‘laws’ behind conflict and its prevention through 
rigorous and falsifiable empirical research. The implicit or sometimes explicit vision is 
to replicate the success of classical medicine as a field that managed to ascertain the 
causes of most illnesses or diseases,  radically improved the accuracy and timeliness of 
diagnoses, and developed, tested and rolled out a range of preventive, mitigating and 
curing treatments, for instance through vaccination programmes. Whilst scholars 
engaged in quantitative or model-based conflict forecasting community acknowledge 
some of the limitations in reliability, they expect that their science will eventually be 
reliable enough to help with ‘solving’ the problem of violent conflict. Such a positivist 
“science” approach to conflict prevention is often based on rational choice assumptions 
such as methodological individualism, cost-benefit calculations, and a correlational 
logic. The main theoretical purpose is to explain the causes of phenomena such as civil 
war onset through large-n data sets as well as to predict probable events, for example 
through agent-based modelling (Lustick, Garces, & McCauley, 2017), formal modelling 
(Andrew H. Kydd, 2010), and other quantitative forecasting methods (Goldstone et al., 
2010). Accordingly, its main areas of application are conflict analysis, detection, and 
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forecasting. Typical products of such an approach are “watch lists” that assign risks of 
conflict or violence to specific countries as well as other warnings products.2  
The second approach to conflict prevention as a craft assumes that competent 
practitioners with the right skills and training can ‘fix’ the problem when given the right 
instruments and embedded in efficient organisational structures and processes. It is 
centred on the idea that there is a clearly identifiable professional field of practitioners 
engaged in implementing conflict prevention policies, especially those with clearly 
defined roles within an appropriately designed overall warning-response system such as 
analysts, diplomats, mediators, or policy-planners. This line of research connects with 
administration studies and organisational sociology, but emanates in most cases from 
reviews by the organisations themselves together with specialised consultancies, think-
tanks and NGOs. Beyond explanation, many studies in this approach have a strong 
normative bend towards proscribing “ideal” policies, using single or comparative case 
studies.  
There may be different elements of craft in the field, for instance, how to 
measure certain warning indicators or fill in risk matrixes, but much of the attention has 
focused on the frequently used terms of the conflict prevention ‘toolbox’, i.e. under 
which conditions a given number of instruments of statecraft and international 
intervention are most likely to be successful (Lund, 2009; Major, Pietz, Schöndorf, & 
Hummel, 2011). One can find this most frequently in country-specific reports from 
think tanks (International Crisis Group, 2016) or strategy documents coming from 
foreign affairs or multi-national bureaucracies (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2005). 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the Global Conflict Risk Index compiled by the European Union based on 
open sources, http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, last accessed 8 June 2018. 
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The least frequently used lens in the field conceives of conflict prevention as an 
art. By art, we refer to a reflexive, intuitive form of knowledge as a practical 
achievement, as referenced in practice theoretical approaches to diplomacy (Pouliot and 
Cornut, 2015, p. 11). The approach has affinity with social constructivist orientations, 
but can also be linked to critical approaches as far as ethical trade-offs are concerned. 
Here the idea is that CP is strongly centred on individuals, their expertise, skills, 
attitudes, motivations and relationships, which are partly underpinned by their cognitive 
and emotional intelligence and personality traits, partly created through experience 
gathered by working in the relevant professional fields, on specific cases and in 
different contexts and situation. These individuals have developed an intuitive, often 
instinctual ‘feel’ for how conflict situations may develop and what may work when with 
whom and what they, personally, can achieve in particular situations and cases when 
working with others given their reputation (Bicchi, 2011; Bode, 2015; Distler, 2016; 
Pouliot, 2008). They are also sensitive to the moral dilemmas and potential risks 
inherent in decisions about whether, when, and how to act.  
The theoretical ambition of such approaches is to deconstruct power structures 
and reveal conditions of possibility, often using ethnographic methods, process-tracing, 
and discourse analysis. These approaches are prevalent in the study of diplomacy as 
social practice, which involves a situational knowledge and procedural know-how in 
dealing with difficult situations, people and creating solutions amidst difficult trade-
offs, moral dilemmas and entrenched opposition among conflict parties (Adler-Nissen 
and Pouliot, 2014; Collins and Packer, 2006; Cornut, 2015b). Critical approaches to 
peacebuilding as well as some literature in the “local turn” of peace and conflict studies 
emphasize the everyday and emancipatory aspects of prevention and diplomatic 
intervention (Chandler, 2010; Kanno, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2014; Richmond and Mac 
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Ginty, 2015). The critique of liberal peacebuilding and the local turn in peacebuilding, 
however, have also been criticized for their ambiguous relationship to real-world 
interventions and dichotomy of the local and the international (Pfaffenholz, 2015). 
Typical preventive practices in this approach may be activism by experienced senior 
diplomats and mediators, behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy, third generation citizen-
based early warning systems involving local leaders, and inter-faith initiatives. More 
generally, formats that privilege reflection and engagement like structured dialogues 
and workshops with diplomats and/or conflict actors would be practices in line with the 
“art” approach (cf. Schierenbeck, 2015, p. 1030). 
It is worth emphasizing that these three approaches are ideal types as both 
research and practice may straddle the described boundaries. Our contention is that 
studies that touch on several approaches, depending on the research question, can use 
the respective strengths and limitations in a complementary fashion. Most importantly, 
an overemphasis on rationalist and organisational approaches de-politicizes conflict 
prevention and ignores the political dynamics both in intervening as well as in 
intervener countries.  
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Table 1: Overview of Conflict Prevention Assumptions, Orientations and Practices 
 Science Craft Art 
Theoretical 
orientations 
Rational choice, 
methodological 
individualism 
Administration 
studies, 
organisational 
sociology 
Social 
constructivism, 
practice theory, 
critical theory 
Epistemic 
objectives 
Explanation and 
prediction 
Explanation and 
proscription 
Understanding and 
critique 
Measurability of 
success 
Probability of events 
derived from a 
statistical model 
Behavioural logic 
governed by 
institutional design 
Conditions of 
possibility 
governed by 
meaning-in-use  
Implied theory 
of change 
Problem-solving: 
strengthen state 
institutions, increase 
inclusion 
Incentivize desired 
behaviour through 
rules and 
procedures, e.g. 
(lifting) sanctions 
Encourage 
reflexivity, suggest 
discursive 
strategies and 
balancing trade-
offs 
Main areas of 
application 
Conflict analysis and 
risk assessment 
Policy tools and 
instruments 
Organisational 
decision-making, 
diplomacy, 
individual 
skilfulness 
Products and 
practices 
Watch-lists and 
forecasting briefs 
Toolbox, country-
specific reports 
Dialogue, 
workshops, 
facilitation, 
convening 
 
In the past few years, the political settlement literature has started  to remedy the gap 
that we identify to some degree, in so far as authors using that approach explicitly 
recognize trade-offs and dilemmas and discuss the politics and the impact of 
international interventions on conflicts (Cheng, Goodhand, & Meehan, 2018; Khan, 
2017; Menocal, 2017, p. 571). This literature has been strongly driven by the policy 
world, in particular the UK Department for International Development (DfID, 2010; 
Gutierrez, 2011), and risks over-emphasizing material causes of violence rather than 
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ideational ones. As such, the political settlements literature, with its roots in political 
economy, could benefit equally from more insights from the social constructivist, 
critical, and practice theoretical approach that we call the “art” of conflict prevention. 
In the following sections, we discuss three main areas of conflict prevention, 
which have been dominated by one of the three approaches: forecasting and warning 
about violent conflict, organisational processes and decision-making structures, and 
diplomatic engagement and interventions. We show how insights from relatively 
marginalized approaches can complement research, with benefits for the practice of 
conflict prevention in foreign ministries and multilateral bureaucracies.  
3 From forecasting to early warning 
Timely and effective preventive action requires some understanding of the likely 
trajectory of conflict, its causes and consequences within and beyond a specific polity. 
This understanding, or knowledge, needs to be transformed into effective warnings, 
sometimes as an integral part of Early Warning and Response Systems (Matveeva, 
2006; Nyheim, 2009). Considerable attention has been paid to identifying risk factors of 
violent conflict, and using them to create forecasting models and country watch lists. 
Rationalist assumptions have treated prevention as a science, creating probabilistic 
models of civil war onset and intervention (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Patrick M Regan and Meachum, 2014). 
Quantitative data and models can play a useful function in directing attention and 
further research, particularly in the rare cases when the indicators and models pinpoint 
countries that have not yet been at the centre of political attention. Quantitative data 
more generally can challenge those country experts who have become complacent about 
their understanding of a conflict, fail to update their assumptions and listen to new 
actors beyond their established sources and networks. Risk-based models can also be 
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helpful for structural and more long-term conflict prevention or conflict-sensitive 
development policy programming.  
However, these ‘scientific’ models struggle when conflict prevention is required in the 
shorter term of a few months up to 1.5 years, or when the political stakes are high. 
Given their large-N basis they often fail in being sufficiently reliable and precise about 
the single cases where there is most uncertainty and to move from correlation to 
causality. Findings that established democracies are less likely to experience civil war 
(Goldstone, et al., 2010) do not provide answers how fragile states become more 
democratic while mitigating conflict risks. Countries in transition from autocracy to 
democracy are, in fact, particularly vulnerable to instability (Cederman, Hug, & Krebs, 
2010). Our interviews with decision-makers show wide-spread scepticism about the 
utility of quantitative forecasting both in terms of confidence in the reliability of the 
method, but more importantly in terms of the usefulness of the results. Decision-makers 
feel there is hardly any surprise about which countries are on the top of the watchlist. 
They want to know about the timing, nature, scale and wider consequences of the 
escalation of violence, not just whether there is risk of civil war or mass atrocities.3 This 
ultimately reflects the reality that high-level political mobilisation can rarely be reduced 
to humanitarian concerns, but impinges on other interests in foreign policy too. 
The most impactful kinds of assessment about future conflict will have to come from 
credible and authoritative individual experts, whether from inside or outside of 
government. The most valuable warnings are those that spot major discontinuities in 
                                                 
3 Various interviews, including one senior US advisor, Washington, September 2009, a US 
development official in October 2009, a former UK diplomat in March 2018, and another UK 
government official in September 2016. The latter commented that whereas early warning 
frameworks usually identify risks, “what decision-makers by and large want is prediction”.  
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existing conflicts where a degree of low-level violence and public threats can be 
considered “normal” or where violence erupts in countries that have not experienced it 
for a long time in their history. It requires bold analytical judgements that previous 
patterns are changing and that previous assumptions about some of the conflict parties 
are no longer correct. This in turn requires analysts to have the time, imagination and 
career incentives to explore scenarios that are outside the prevailing conventional 
wisdom. For instance, it meant questioning the assumption rooted in so called rationalist 
mirror-imaging that the Georgian leadership in 2008 would not be so irrational as to 
take military action to recapture South Ossetia given the likely Russian response.4 In the 
case of Ukraine 2014, it would have meant accepting that Russia would not shy away 
from breaking numerous international treaties and norms underpinning security in 
Europe by mobilising military forces in Crimea and Donbass and formally annex 
territory of a sovereign state.5  
Unfortunately, early warning mechanisms too often focus on mere information 
gathering. Reporting from embassies and field missions is important, but too often the 
analysis falls by the wayside.6 UN officials, for example, are flooded with daily and 
weekly reports from peace operations that detail clashes and other security incidents, 
but much less with analytical narratives that provide relevant contexts, make 
judgements, and, at best, provide options for decision-makers how to engage.7 A craft 
perspective can help to address some organisational disincentives to warn or make sure 
                                                 
4 According to an OSCE as well as an EU official, June 2010, cited in Brante (2011, pp. 211-
212). 
5 Interviews with EU and Polish officials, July and August 2017. 
6 One reason for this is the increased caution of diplomats to write down sensitive analysis in the 
wake of leaks, hacks, official reviews, and freedom of information requests, see Fletcher  (2016, 
pp. 117-132). 
7 Interview with UN official, Juba, October 2017. 
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that foreign affairs bureaucracies provide adequate training and instructions to 
ambassadors and their deputies, supported by strong hand-overs to avoid the loss of 
institutional memory on the ground. 
At the same time, persuading decision-makers to accept politically highly 
inconvenient warnings requires an understanding of how experts are being perceived by 
a given decision-maker who is always sceptical about being lobbied and manipulated by 
experts. Credibility of expert warnings is partly rooted in competent craft of the 
individual, i.e. his or her own track-record in previous conflict analysis and warnings, 
but is also a matter of art of persuasion and relationship building. It depends on experts 
being seen not only as authoritative, but also truthful, credible and free of hidden policy 
biases. 
Successful warning means that experts need to be highly aware of decision-
makers’ pre-existing knowledge, interests and worldviews in order to guide their 
research and effectively tailor any warnings or policy advice. Some of these world-
views are a matter of personal experience, others go back to collective memories and 
lessons learnt from history, particularly relevant in a multi-national setting. When 
German leaders looked at the Ukraine crisis of 2014, they saw a World War I scenario 
in which competition between major powers can easily spiral out of control through 
unintentionally provocative actions. Poland, in contrast, drew on the historical paradigm 
of 1940 and saw an authoritarian leader using compatriots in other countries as a pretext 
for military action and land-grab (Meyer, De Franco, Brante, & Otto, Forthcoming). 
Effective persuasion is therefore an art that works with these hot buttons or bypasses the 
most strongly held diagnostic assumptions. Warners would also benefit from a clear 
understanding of how they are seen by decision-makers, whether they are part of the 
‘in-group’ or as politically suspicious. Warners need to appreciate that some decision-
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makers are highly confident in their own judgements, partly because of their ready 
access to senior foreign leaders. Therefore, truly persuasive conflict warnings do not 
just require good data and reliable theories about cause and effect relationship (the 
science). They also need individuals with the knowledge, authority and skills to master 
the art of persuasion and organisations that complement information gathering with 
cultivating individual country expertise. It means that experts and decision-makers need 
to interact more frequently. 
4 From refining institutional design to empowering courageous officials 
Organisational questions have taken up an important space in writings on conflict 
prevention. The description of the “warning-response gap” by George and Holl (2000) 
nearly twenty years ago served a catalysing function for this debate. Aside from a 
number of cognitive challenges of decision-makers that we already  touched upon, they 
also identified the lack of dedicated staff (George and Holl, 2000, pp. 29-30). Three 
distinct challenges continue to occupy students of prevention in this regards, as Rubin 
(2002a, p. 195) wrote: whether decision-making authority should be centralized 
providing for clear leadership or decentralized given frequent bottlenecks in the 
bureaucratic apparatus, whether prevention should be mainstreamed across an 
organisation or rather assigned a dedicated unit, and how inter-departmental or inter-
agency coordination could be improved while maintaining clear accountability.  
This literature reflects a “science” and “craft” perspective of conflict prevention: 
creating organisational structures that include or foster expertise for example through 
data analysis tools, and that provide efficient processes that bring the right information 
in an adequate format to decision-makers. These questions certainly remain important 
today, including in policy practice. The recent reform of the peace and security 
architecture in the UN secretariat, for example, includes merging the analysis divisions 
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of the department of political affairs and the department of peacekeeping operations into 
joint regional divisions (UN Secretary-General, 2018, p. 20), which will combine the 
knowledge from both situations with a UN mission and without a political or peace 
operation and, according to UN officials, free up space for more long-term tasks related 
to prevention.8 
Social constructivist and practice theoretical insights, what we call the art of prevention, 
can provide potentially useful additions to the study of organisational structures and 
processes in prevention. Conflict prevention is also vaguely defined, and associated 
with considerable uncertainty as we have seen. If some studies and reports thus point to 
decentralising decision-making authority (Eckhard, 2016; Jentleson, 2000a; Task Force 
on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013), for example to ambassadors and heads 
of UN missions or even field offices, they are asked to perform risky tasks without 
being able to rely on clear instructions. When the members of the UN Security Council 
cannot agree on specific guidance and an overarching political strategy, for example, 
UN peacekeeping officials on the ground need to come up with the adequate posture in 
a given situation themselves (Mamiya, 2018). 
The role of individuals and the agency of diplomats and senior UN officials thus 
becomes important. As organisational sociology tells us, if tasks are vaguely or 
inconsistently defined, staff members need to figure out what they mean themselves, 
based on situational requirements, their own beliefs and experiences, and external 
pressure (Wilson, 2000, p. 34). Human resources policies have a bearing on conflict 
prevention in organisations: what kind of people are selected for which tasks? Which 
skill sets and experience contribute to a pro-active and forward-looking behaviour that 
                                                 
8 Interview with senior UN official, New York, 18 April 2018. 
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anticipates violence? How do career incentives impact individuals to report on and 
discuss potentially inconvenient observations that challenge existing policies with 
regard to political dynamics in a country? 
Postings in countries with a low domestic salience may not advance the career of 
individual diplomats in the same way as those in countries that are at the forefront of a 
foreign minister’s agenda. The latter’s cables will make it more often to the desks of 
senior officials. If prevention requires forward-looking and proactive behaviour, 
ambition is important to inquire about rumours, and to facilitate discussions about 
politically contentious issues among relevant stakeholders in a country. Before crises 
escalate, there may not be an explicit instruction from an embassy’s capital to even get 
tentatively involved in such activities. In contrast, if diplomats go above and beyond the 
ordinary role description of a political officer, and, for example, travel to remote 
conflict-affected areas, whether their efforts are rewarded matters. In our interviews 
with German diplomats, it was common to hear that, Afghanistan and Iraq aside, 
postings in conflict-affected countries do not necessarily pay off for a career.9 
An organizational environment that rewards bold behaviour and unconventional 
thinking is thus crucial for conflict prevention. Creating such an environment in large 
bureaucratic systems that run on hierarchies and established procedures is a tall order. 
Formal procedures and organisational structures may contribute to a “culture of 
prevention”, which was a key term used by UN leadership and inter-governmental 
agreements around the change of the millennium (UN General Assembly, 1999, p. 3; 
2005, para. 74). Those rules may help to create, but not by itself make up, such an 
organisational culture. Studying European diplomats in Kiev, Hofius (2016), for 
                                                 
9 Anonymous interviews, Berlin, 25 July 2017 and 8 August 2017. 
  20 
example, finds that their “boundary work” created a common European diplomatic 
community in Ukraine. Accordingly, beliefs, practices, and other taken-for-granted 
knowledge that staff members hold about their organisation (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 
p. 153) deserve more attention in the study of organisational aspects of prevention.  
5 From a toolbox to prevention as everyday practice 
How can external actors get parties to a conflict to refrain from resorting to organized 
violence in managing their disputes? And how can they use their power in a way that is 
legitimate and improves rather than worsens the situation on the ground? There 
continues to be risk of perceiving prevention as doing things that are generally 
considered "good" such as anti-corruption work, or promoting inclusive governance 
mechanisms. But the assumption that such inherently "good" activities always lead to 
more stable and less violent outcomes is fundamentally flawed (Autesserre, 2017). 
Similarly, seemingly morally questionable actions such as paying off an autocratic ruler 
to convince him to step down may be part of preventive diplomacy, as seen in 
ECOWAS’ negotiations with President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia in early 2017 
(Hartman, 2017).  
Good intentions are not sufficient either – design flaws, unintended consequences, lack 
of resources, lack of local knowledge and other implementation problems may lead to 
the failure of international preventive actions (Autesserre, 2014; Hunt, 2017). The 
making of prevention policy is not just about finding the “political will” to do the right 
thing, to intervene and use the power of external actors to change political dynamics on 
the ground. Diplomatic interventions always run the risk of creating incentives for 
rebellion and further entrenching conflicts, thus making the situation worse than if 
international actors had never been involved in the first place (De Waal, 2015, pp. 26-
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27; Kuperman, 2008; A. H. Kydd and Straus, 2013). The ethical compass that diplomats 
bring with them thus matters as well.  
Difficult questions about goals and consequences are never far away from questions of 
which kinds of power or course of action is efficient to attain abstract “prevention” or 
“stabilisation” goals. In the study of preventive engagement, the question of power 
usually refers to a dichotomy between coercive and cooperative means. Alternatively, 
one may differentiate between interest-based (rationalist) or idea-based (transformative) 
approaches of prevention. Mediation research has found that a combination of power 
and „pure“ mediators has the highest likelihood of success (Svensson, 2007). Case 
study research on preventive diplomacy during the 1990s has come to the same demand 
for „mixed approaches“ (Jentleson, 2000b). As such, positivist approaches that 
understand conflict prevention as a craft dominate this field. 
To a smaller extent, there have also been rationalist approaches in the “science” 
approach to prevention. Large-n approaches usually operate on a very high level of 
abstraction, thus reducing the conclusions that can be drawn for prevention in any given 
situation. Regan et al. (2009), for example, only differentiate between military, 
economic, and diplomatic interventions. Öberg et al. (2009) categorize interventions in 
twelve different ways, finding that the vast majority of interventions in their dataset was 
either related to “verbal attention” or “facilitation”. Coding media reports, while helpful 
to generate a baseline of events (Möller, 2010, p. 29), thus does not facilitate an 
understanding how such measures looked like in particular, and which combinations of 
particular messages in which conditions had which kind of effects – further 
disaggregation decreases the number of observations and the correlational conclusions 
that we can reasonably draw from them. Öberg et al. (2009)’s data include an important 
observation at the macro level though, which requires further specification through 
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causal mechanisms and qualitative research. They find that in situations where external 
actors were involved, war broke out twice as likely as in cases where they did not. 
Again, social constructivist, practice theoretical and critical approaches can 
complement the perspectives of craft and science well. Two particular examples include 
the constructivist attention to non-material sources of power such as discourse and 
ideas, as well as coordination of diplomatic approaches as a particular international 
practice. 
In their highly cited work on power in international politics, Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall (2005) describe a taxonomy of power, which not only includes 
compulsory power, but also more indirect and diffuse forms of power. For preventive 
action, these forms of power would include the discursive power of international actors: 
not bound by the taboos and biases of the parties to a conflict, international actors have 
the power to name issues, events, circumstances, and by doing so, to bring deep-seated 
problems out in the open. International actors also have institutional power (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004), for example in the UN Security Council, as well as acting through 
international public administrations to create peacebuilding plans and development 
assistance frameworks through which international aid is dispersed.  
One of the most important preventive tools of the UN system is coordinating an 
internationally coherent approach, as Ben Majekodunmi (2017) from the Office of the 
Secretary-General argues. Through its projects and offices around the country, a UN 
Country Team or peace operation can gather information about political, development, 
and human rights challenges. Through regular briefings, it provides a platform for 
embassies and high commissions to create a shared analysis. Coordination practices 
may create a sense of community (Hofius, 2016), where diplomats confirm their 
respective assessments of a political situation, not the least because they tend to have 
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the same channels of information. Seemingly small issues like how diplomats come to 
work every day, can have a ripple effect on their exposure to rumours and information 
sources beyond established networks that may overemphasize stability and government 
narratives (Cornut, 2015b).   
Preventive diplomacy relies on experience, skills, personality, personal relationships, 
institutional networks and other largely implicit characteristics. How external actors use 
their power, and how they construct the role of stakeholders in the politics of their host 
states, creates ethical dilemmas and trade-offs. The power of diplomats and UN envoys 
to facilitate a dialogue among conflict parties is a practical matter of navigating a face-
to-face situation as well as creating opportunities for interaction. What these skills are, 
how they can be fostered, and how experience and situational factors influence 
preventive diplomacy deserves further study.  
6 Conclusion 
We have argued that the science and craft approaches as developed above can 
play a useful role in some aspects of conflict prevention, but significantly underplay 
how analytically difficult, bureaucratically disruptive, politically controversial, and 
ethically ambiguous the challenges involved are. The ‘art’ approach is an important 
corrective to demands from governments and international organizations to provide 
evidence for „what works“ in prevention (Cramer, Goodhand, & Morris, 2016). In 
particular, we need more systematic studies of how diplomatic practices may achieve 
any intended results, including everyday practice such as in coordination mechanisms, 
and the power of discourse. Whilst programmatic interventions are easier to evaluate 
than diplomatic ones, they need to be complemented by political analysis, institutional 
processes, and savvy engagement. Adjusting methods and research design beyond 
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single case studies and including more sociological and ethnographic approaches can 
help to better understand the politics and the art of prevention, including the constraints 
under which decision-makers operate. Instead of simply calling for diplomats to deal 
more with local civil society and other non-state actors, scholars should study the 
hidden or unintended incentives for diplomats to follow through on that advice in 
specific situations and local settings. Similarly, large-N approaches to analysing and 
forecasting conflicts would benefit from insights about how to improve individual 
expert judgement and tailoring research more to the consequences decision-makers care 
about the most. In order to understand warning-response and receptivity problems 
within organisations, research needs to look beyond organigrams and procedures at 
organisational cultures, career-incentives, and individual beliefs and practices. It needs 
to take reflexive and embedded practices seriously (cf. Cornut, 2018). 
Three specific points about conflict prevention research and practice stand out: We need 
greater humility in understanding the various obstacles to conflict prevention. Renewed 
enthusiasm for prevention at the UN and elsewhere is welcome, but practitioners should 
be careful not to sell prevention as a silver bullet. One part of that humility would be a 
more limited understanding of success in prevention. As outcomes on the macro level 
remain difficult to measure and to connect to individual policy measures, more process-
oriented indicators may be more helpful. Such evaluations should take into account the 
different nature of prevention as science, craft, or art, depending on the context and task 
involved: the science of information gathering and creating indicators for conflict 
requires different answers than the craft of analysis and early warning or the art of 
preventive diplomacy. More importantly, science is not just about conflict analysis, but 
also about studying decision-making procedures, and craft is not just about 
organisational boxes and diplomatic instruments, but also relates to training of 
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diplomatic skills and the knowledge of individuals. Lastly, individual experience, “the 
art”, does not just lie in the engagement with conflict parties, but also in managing 
political processes at home. 
In researching and trying to foster prevention in organisations, we need greater attention 
to the individual level. Early warning that questions established policy is disruptive, just 
as diplomatic engagements that raise sensitive issues with local stakeholders requires a 
fine balancing act. Incentives and capacities are important, but these practices require 
leadership and rely on human agency. Effective warning and prevention is ‘people 
business’ and requires cultivating and empowering officials at different levels with the 
courage, knowledge, social skills and credibility. 
Consequently, our understanding of conflict prevention needs to shift away from an 
overemphasis of information gathering about conflict risks to understanding the 
individual, organisational and political dimensions of prevention as part of a country’s 
overall foreign policy (or organizational mission in case of an international 
organization). Finally, no government or international organization will base their 
foreign policy or organizational mission solely on the potential needs of a third country. 
As they serve their constituencies in capitals and headquarters, preventive ambitions 
often compete with other interests. It is therefore up to citizens to hold decision-makers 
accountable when it comes to creating more effective conflict prevention. 
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